讲座题目：

1. The Platform’s Long-term Anti-counterfeiting Strategy

2. Product Bundling and Distributional Fairness

主讲嘉宾：1. 岳晓航； 2. 曹庆宁

时间：2025年6月10日（周二）上午9:00--12:00

地点：六合彩网站 304会议室

欢迎广大师生参加！

数智运营与供应链管理研究团队

2025年6月6日

主讲嘉宾简介

1．岳晓航，美国威斯康星大学米尔沃基分校(The University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee)教授，其主要从事供应链与物流管理、生产与市场管理和工业制造系统管理的研究工作。目前已在 Operations Research、Information System Research、Production and Operations Management等期刊等国期刊上发表论文70余篇。

2．曹庆宁，中国科学技术大学副教授，博士毕业于美国德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校运营管理系，曾在美国范德堡大学（Vanderbilt University）从事博士后研究工作。其研究聚焦运营与技术融合下的新兴商业机制，涵盖捆绑销售策略、游戏经济学、直播新零售、生成式人工智能等方向。近年来在 Production and Operations Management、Journal of Retailing 等国际高水平期刊发表多篇论文，并多次担任 Management Science、M&SOM、POM 等权威期刊的审稿人。主持包括国家自然科学基金青年项目、面上项目在内的多项科研课题，致力于以理论分析方法服务于数字经济背景下的管理实践。

讲座主要内容

1.This paper investigates the counterfeit-combating problem on an ecommerce platform with a brand-name company and a representative online counterfeiter who can strategically choose which type of counterfeits to sell. Methodology/results: Our analysis reveals that consumers are deceived and receive counterfeit goods due to a platform’s strategic reaction to a counterfeiter’s product strategy. Although many e-commerce platforms publicly claim that they have “zero tolerance” for counterfeits, we find that e-commerce platforms will deliberately reduce the effort devoted to combating counterfeiting and turn a blind eye to the sales of deceptive counterfeits to avoid competition between branded products and counterfeits.

2.Consumers perceive prices as unfair when a firm’s profit margin is disproportionately high relative to the monetary benefit they receive. When consumers with fairness concerns purchase products at unfair prices, they experience psychological disutility. This paper investigates how consumer fairness concerns affect a firm’s product bundling and pricing strategy, as well as the impact on consumer surplus and overall social welfare. Our study uncovers several key insights. First, although traditional bundling research suggests that bundling high-cost products would be detrimental to a firm, we show that this is not always true when consumers have strong fairness concerns. Thus, our study presents a new rationale for bundling in enabling a high-cost firm to mitigate consumers’ perceptions of price unfairness by increasing their willingness to pay. Second, while it seems intuitive that firms should lower prices as fairness concerns increase, we find that the opposite can occur in markets with heterogeneous consumers. Third, contrary to the common belief that bundling mainly benefits firms by extracting consumer surplus, we find that bundling can actually improve the welfare of fairness-conscious consumers. As a result, our findings suggest that banning bundling in certain industries may not be the most effective regulatory approach. Additionally, we explore the role of cost disclosure. We find that both firms and policymakers may favor disclosing costs, as it can increase profits and social welfare. However, when disclosure benefits society but reduces the firm’s profits, policymakers may need to intervene and require firms to reveal costs for the greater public good.